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WHAT THE COURTS ARE DOING TO STAMP OUT
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
By STANLEY B. HOUCK

Chairmanof Committee on Unauthorized Practiceof the
Law of the American Bar Association
ITHIN recent months, with respect to the acts and
activities, legal in nature and character, of those not
licensed to practice law:
(1)
The substantive law, while applied somewhat
more frequently than heretofore, has been applied without
particularly startling or novel results to the situations presented to the courts as they have normally developed.
(2) The irregular, not to say unprofessional, conduct
of attorneys advising, facilitating, or participating in such
acts, has been vigorously condemned by the courts, and the
gross impropriety of such conduct has been emphasized and,
in some cases, punished.
(3)
The technique of procedure in proceedings to present such acts to the courts for appropriate action had been
made more direct and much more simple, logical and sensible.
(4) The nature of the judicial function, in respect to
all such matters and conditions, has been, for the first time,
accurately and clearly expressed and determined; and the significance and effect thereof upon the suitable administration
of justice and upon the broad public interest has been more
truly recognized and more effectively translated into effective
action.
Otherwise expressed, the judicial function and its agents,
the judiciary, have been noticeably invigorated, spurred and
inspired to action, and caused to recognize an affirmative instead of a merely negative duty toward the whole problem.
In the decided cases, there has been reflected and expressed
the gradually gathering ultimate effect and significance of limited applications of substantive principles, and an accumulative recognition that more simple and direct procedural methods are necessary and wholly appropriate.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January
30, 1935, in response to questions propounded by an order
of the General Court (the legislature) of Massachusetts, said:
269
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"It is inherent in the judicial department of government under
the constitution to control the practice of the law * * *
The judicial department can not be circumscribed or restricted
in the performance of these duties. * * * Permission to practice law is within the exclusive cognizance of the judicial
department."
More elaborately expressed in general outline, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has summarized the nature of
the judicial function as follows:
"Under our system of law the most effective guaranty of equal

justice to all in the commonwealth is a competent and learned bar

composed of men of high personal character who govern their professional conduct at all times by the well known and generally accepted
canons of legal ethics. The lack of such a bar, or the co-existence with
it of an array of individuals or groups operating under deceptive devices
and catch-names to mislead the public into the belief that they are
entrusting their causes to those learned in the law and competent to
serve them, would inevitably result in a deprivation of justice to many
in the state. In such an atmosphere, there would be a strong tendency
for the bar to sink to the level of its unauthorized and unqualified
competitors."

In this article it will not be possible to detail all that the
courts have done recently. Only the more striking-perhaps
not even the more important-things will be referred to.
The activities of automobile associations have been thoroughly considered and the restraint imposed upon their activities has been most sweeping and far-reaching. The most
recent case, which in nowise recedes from the earlier cases, was
decided March 18, 1936 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State, ex rel. Attorney General v. Carolina Motor
Club Incorporated and American Automobile Association.
Antedating this case were: Goodman v. The Motorists' Alliance, 29 0. N. P. 31; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association (R. I.), 179 A. 139, decided May
9, 1935, and People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor Club (Ill.), 199 N. E. 1, decided October 14,
1935.
These cases, in effect, forbid such associations to render
any legal service whatsoever or to furnish attorneys for their
members, including such services in criminal prosecutions for
negligence or manslaughter while in the operation of a motor
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vehicle, or for a violation of state law, town or city ordinance
concerning the operation of such vehicles, the furnishing of
counsel to bring suit free of charge to collect damages or to
defend the member against such suits and the furnishing of
consultation and free legal advice to the members of his family, his agent, servant or employe, in matters relating to the
use, operation, ownership, licensing and transfer of motor
vehicles.
Practice of law by laymen in workmen's compensation
and industrial commission cases has been broadly enjoined
and completely restricted by lower court decisions in Michigan
and Oklahoma. An undecided case raising every phase of the
question is pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois.
February 26, 1936, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Goodman
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 130 Ohio State 427, rendered a partially unsatisfactory opinion when it permitted
laymen, such as representatives of the employer or representatives of an organization to which a claimant may belong,
"to assist an injured or deceased workman, or his dependents,
in the submission of a claim." The court stated: "Such
usually simple services are, for the most part, performed in an
expeditious and satisfactory manner. In our judgment, this
is not the practice of law; but in so holding it is neither our
intention nor purpose to modify the definition of the practice
of law announced in the first paragraph of the syllabus of
Land Title Abstract and Trust Company v. Dworken, 129
Ohio State 23, 193 N. E. 650. Of course, exceptional cases
may arise from time to time where legal problems are involved
in the presentation of claims, but it is the ordinary claim and
not the exceptional one which now engages our attention."
The court concludes: "Our conclusion is that appearances
and practice before the Industrial Commission do not ordinarily .orproperly constitute the practice of law up to the time
when a claimant first receives notice of the disallowance of his
claim under Section 1465-90, G. C., and are subject to the
regulation and control of the Industrial Commission as
granted by statute. Thereafter, rehearing proceedings before
the Commission do constitute the practice of law and must be
conducted exclusively and personally by an attorney or attorneys at law, duly admitted to practice, and the defendants are
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therefore prohibited from recognizing or entertaining representation, in the particular noted, by those failing to meet
such qualification."
Cases against banks and trust companies have recently
been almost missing from the dockets. The last decision of a
Supreme Court upon this subject is the Missouri case, State v.
St. Louis Union Trust Company (Mo.), 74 S. W. (2d)
348. Since that decision, however, a lower court in Michigan
has reached substantially the same conclusion which has been
appealed and is now pending before the Supreme Court of
Michigan; and, on January 29, 1936, the District Court of
Ellis County, Oklahoma, granted a sweeping injunction
against all unauthorized activities by Oklahoma banks.
As has been the case for some time, recently the activities
of collection agencies have held the center of the stage so far
as volume of litigation is concerned. The recent cases have
been: State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail Credit Association
(Okla.), 37 P. (2d) 954; Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit
Association, 42 P. (2d) 214; Depew v. Wichita Association
of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P. (2d) 1041; People, ex
rel. Chicago Bar Association v. The Securities Discount Corporation, 279 Ill. App. 70; Washington State Bar Association v. Merchant's Rating and Adjustment Company
(Wash.), 49 P. (2d) 26, and a number of lower court cases,
most of which resulted in injunctions without the rendering
of an opinion. Probably the most valuable of these lower
court cases is the memorandum of Judge Frank G. Sutton, Jr.,
of Richmond, Virginia, in the Bar Association of the City of
Richmond v. The Richmond Association of Credit Men, Incorporated.
These cases have covered almost every conceivable activity of collection and similar agencies.
The action extends
from complete prohibition, as in the case of innumerable
injunctions issued in Massachusetts, to a more tolerant attitude such as is reflected in the Washington case referred to.
Perhaps the most interesting advance was made in the
last decided Kansas case. The Supreme Court of Kansas held
that it was the practice of law for the Wichita Association of
Credit Men and its principal officer, for himself and the association, to use blanks and send solicitations of proofs of claim
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and powers of attorney in bankruptcy proceedings and, holding such powers of attorney, to vote for and elect himself as
trustee in cases pending in the bankruptcy division of the Federal court; and, as trustee, to turn accounts for collection over
to the collection department of the association and pay collection fees to it for such collections, and to generally vote such
claims in the bankruptcy court and do such other things as a
holder of a power of attorney is accustomed to do. February
17, 1936, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
in this case.
Two New York Federal district courts have adopted
very broad and sweeping rules regulating the conduct of laymen in bankruptcy proceedings. These rules particularly
have reference to solicitation of claims by laymen. It should
be said in this connection that the United States District
Court at Toledo, January 13, 1936, reached the opposite
conclusion.
Lower courts in Florida, North Dakota, and Oklahoma
have held that the preparation of a long list of legal instruments constitutes the practice of law and has forbidden specifically such activity. In North Dakota the instruments specified were: warranty deeds, real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages, satisfactions of real estate mortgages, releases of chattel
mortgages, satisfactions of judgments, conditional sales contracts, affidavits of various kinds and dealing with various
subjects, contracts for deed, sheep contracts, house leases,
labor liens, threshers' liens, mechanics' liens for material, mechanics' liens for labor, satisfactions of mechanics' liens, partial
waivers and releases of notices of intention to file mechanics'
liens, notices of intentions and demands before filing mechanics' liens, abandonment and cancellation of notices to file mechanics' liens. In Florida the instruments mentioned were:
any kind of deed or conveyance of real or personal property,
or any mortgage, lease, contract or other such like instrument
or paper relative to such property; will, codicil, option, power
of attorney, property agreement, lien, notice of lien, bond,
assignment of mortgage or contract or claim or chose in action, creditors' claims in probate, notice to vacate premises or
notice to quit or pay rent, vendor's statement of creditors
under the bulk sales law, articles of incorporation or charter.
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In Oklahoma the inhibited documents were: chattel mortgages, contracts of real estate mortgage, deeds, wills, trust
agreements, escrow agreements; and the prohibition included
the acts whether "for or without pay or any promised remuneration," and specified "that the filling in of printed blanks
of a legal nature is of the same effect as if writing the instruments in full."
Since the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Land
Title Abstract and Trust Company v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
State 23, 193 N. E. 650, there have been consent decrees
against title companies in California and in Minnesota; and,
in addition, on December 17, 1935, the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Florida, rendered an opinion and held local
title companies to be in contempt of court for issuing "commercial letters expressing opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real estate * * * where the letters are
not based upon a bona fide application for title insurance."
Late in February the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that it was the practice of law
for a real estate agent not a member of the bar of any court
to secure clients by solicitation and advertisement, to take
leases showing himself as lessor, landlord, and then to conduct
litigation relating to the lease in his own name "merely for the
purpose of collecting money in which he has no interest until
collection thereof."
In a number of recent opinions, the courts have scored in
measured terms the misconduct of attorneys who participate
in, or facilitate, the unauthorized practice ofaaw by laymen.
The most recent, as well as the harshest,- cbmment of this
character is found in Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association (R. I.), 179 A. 139:
"When this arrangement between these lay respondents and the
respondent * * * began to function, not only were they engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, but * * *, notwithstanding his
license from this court, were practicing law in an illegal manner. It
seems to us this conclusion is inescapable. The conduct of the respondent * * * was inconsistent with the ethics of his profession, though
presumably he did not realize this. He seems to have given little
thought to the nature of his association with these lay respondents,
though he was really permitting them to use his authority as an officer
of this court to furnish the foundation of an enterprise that degraded
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his calling to the level of a common huckstering business. This was
certainly not the standard of conduct to be expected of a member of the
bar of this court. Rather, it was the contrary. As an agent and an
aide of the court in the administration of justice, the true lawyer, conscious of the dignity of his calling, will instinctively avoid such associations, notwithstanding that it may mean the foregoing of a more or
less lucrative source of business. Chief Justice Cardozo, in People v.
Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, had this idea in mind when
he expressed himself in the following words: ' "Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions." Matter Of Rouss, 221 N. Y.
84, 116 N. E. 783. The appellant was received into that ancient
fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer
of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court was due,
whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld. He
might be assigned as counsel for the needy, in causes criminal or civil,
serving without pay.' These are not idle words, nor mere rhetoric."

In its decree, later entered in the case, the court said further as to the conduct of the attorney:
"That while the conduct of said respondent * * * in his association with said other respondents was inconsistent with the ethics of
his profession, tending to bring it and himself into degradation and
public contempt, this Court nevertheless feels that his dereliction in the
premises is largely attributable to the inexperience of youth and ignorance of the fundamental relation which should exist between attorney
and client, rather than to any intentional wrongdoing, and that for the
present the unsavory publicity to which he has been subjected as a result
of this proceeding is sufficient punishment, provided, however, he conducts himself blamelessly in the future with respect to said matters and
in a manner becoming a member of the bar of this State."

The procedural methods recently recognized by the
courts will probably do more to eliminate unauthorized practice of law than anything else of recent occurrence.
The first intimation of a more direct method of approaching the problem appeared in Morton v. Beery, decided

November 27, 1933, 39 Ohio L. R. 272.

In that case attor-

neys within its jurisdiction petitioned the court of Common
Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, to order an investigation of
the unauthorized practice of law. The court appointed one
of its own judges to make the investigation. After this judge
had completed his inquiry, appropriate proceedings were
brought against those found to be guilty of unauthorized
practices. Only recently, the Dade County Florida Circuit
Court appointed the members of the Dade County Bar Asso-
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ciation's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law
a committee of the court on the unauthorized practice of the
law and authorized and empowered it to make inquiry into
and to investigate all unauthorized practices; to subpoena
witnesses to appear before it; to administer oaths to such witnesses; to compel the production of books, records, documents
and data necessary to its security and investigation; and to
suppress all instances of the unlawful practice of law and to
report to the court all violators who refuse to desist, to the
end that the court may administer appropriate discipline.
One of the most sound agencies for the elimination of
unauthorized practice anywhere is the committee established
by rule No. 36 of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which appointed in each judicial circuit of that state a bar committee
to be composed of four lawyers. The court also provided
that "upon application of the chairman of the committee, the
clerk of this court shall issue writs of subpoena, including
subpoena duces tecum and dedimus to take depositions. The
committees are empowered to take and transcribe the evidence
of witnesses who shall be sworn by any person authorized by
law to administer oaths, and the committee shall report to this
court the failure of any person to attend and testify in response to any subpoena issued as herein provided."
These committees were charged with duties both with
respect to professional conduct of attorneys, and, also, "shall
make inquiry from time to time as to the unlawful practice of
law by persons not licensed to do so, and where, in the opinion of the majority of the committee, the facts justify it, to
instigate and prosecute, as representatives of the bar, such
action as may be appropriate to suppress such unlawful
practice."
The direct and immediate responsibility of the Supreme
Court of the state to see to it that all practice of law by unlicensed persons, corporations and associations is eliminated
has been better expressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in the Automobile Service Company case, already referred to,
than elsewhere. As to the matter, the court said:
"It is our duty to prevent this unfortunate and evil event whenever it threatens. This court is the agent of the people in the administration of justice in this state and has been vested with ample powers to
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vindicate its authority in this department of the people's government.
It would be recreant to the great trust reposed in it if it did not guard
every agency by which justice is administered. To safeguard the practice of the law, which touches so intimately the administration of justice, and to promote the welfare of the people, whose ministers we are,
this court has ordained certain standards of character and education as a
prerequisite to admission to the bar. These standards are high, as indeed
they ought to be, and there is constant pressure to elevate them still
higher, all to the end that the people may be assured the best possible
service in the dispatch of their legal business. None must be permitted
to evade these requirements by doing indirectly what they cannot do
directly."

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL
MEETING
The 39th annual meeting of The Colorado Bar Association will be held in the Casino of the Stanley Hotel at
Estes Park on September 18 and 19, 1936, the session convening at 1 p. m. on the 18th and ending with the annual
dinner at the hotel at 7:45 p. m. on the 19th.
U. S. Senator David I. Walsh, of Massachusetts, delivers the annual address on Friday evening at 8:30. President
Vidal's address will be on "A Lawyer's Principal Duty."
Other papers will be given by Philip Hornbein, Hudson
Moore, Malcolm Lindsey, Fred Farrar and Erskine R. Myer.
The Association will receive the final report of its Committee on Integration of the Bar and act thereon.
The Stanley Hotel is conducted on the American plan.
Special convention rates are offered its registered guests, to
whom the annual dinner will be presented without additional
charge. To others the cost will be $2 per plate. Bus
service from Denver to Estes Park and return will supply
requisite transportation at P. U. C. rates.
A heavy attendance is anticipated.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE BREACH OF
THE COVENANTS OF QUIET ENJOYMENT AND WARRANTY

Timportance

SYDNEY E. SHUTERAN*

HE current activity in real estate gives impetus to the
of the remedy afforded a covenantee for the
breach of the covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty. While the subject has received only casual attention
from the law courts, being infrequently litigated, it is likely,
however, that the lawyer, because of this increased activity,
will be called upon more often to answer the questions arising
from the breach of these covenants.
Briefly, a covenant of quiet enjoyment may be defined
as an agreement that the grantee will not be evicted by a title
paramount or by any act of the grantor, while the covenant
of warranty is one whereby the grantor agrees to execute any
instrument necessary for the interest of the grantee, and to
defend the premises. Both covenants, then, are assurances to
the purchaser and his assigns against loss of title and possession. They are usually treated as synonymous since the concurrence of the same circumstances is necessary to constitute a
breach.' The covenants relate to the possession of the subject
matter of a conveyance rather than to the state of the title.
The modern covenant of warranty is the outgrowth of the
old common law warranty and is now merely a personal covenant, a breach of which entitles the covenantee to the recovery of damages. The early common law did not recognize
personal covenants; however, the feoffment was usually attended with a warranty which was a common law form of
covenant of title. The remedy upon the warranty developed
*LL.B.. Westminster Law School.
16 Sutherland, Damages, (4th Ed.) ; Hayden v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac.
437 (1906).
2
In ssisses, the tenant could bring a writ of warrantia chaetae against the warrantor to compel him to assist with a good plea or defense, or else render damages.
If there was a recovery against the tenant the judgment simultaneously was good
against the warrantor to recover other lands of equal value. 3 Blackstone 300. Until
the statutes of Merton, Marlbridge, and Gloucester (52 Henll, c. 16. A. D. 1267)
damages were not recoverable for real actions. (See reading of Coke on these statutes,
2 Institute.)
The warranty which usually attended with a feoffment was in its
nature a covenant real. that is, compensation for its breach was awarded, not in damages, but in kind. The judgment was against the warrantor for the recovery of other
lands of equal value to those of which the warrantee had been deprived. The determination of the value, however, was always that of the land at the time the warranty
was made and not the enhanced value at the time of the eviction.
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into what is known as a mixed action wherein the warrantee
recovered land in so far as the warrantor could render other
land of equal value, and damages to make up the deficiency.
This stringent rule was soon to find disfavor, and the warranty became recognized as a personal covenant for the breach
of which an action for damages may be maintained as often as
there is an eviction from any part of the land warranted.
The question of when the cause of action arises is aided
in Colorado by statutory enactment which provides that nc
right of action on the covenant may be had after possession is
given until the party menacing possession shall have commenced legal proceedings and the grantor after notice shall
have refused or failed to defend." The covenant is not broken
by a tortious disturbance nor by an eviction by a stranger
because it is beyond the control of the grantor and the grantee
may have his remedy against the wrongdoer. Cases hold that
a paramount title amounts to an eviction, but in Colorado
under the statute referred to an eviction alone is insufficient.
The covenantee cannot surrender possession to the holder of
the paraount title before suit is brought.'
In Tierney v. Whiting,5 the plaintiff sued for breach of
the covenant claiming eviction by paramount title. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was never lawfully evicted.
The plaintiff had derived title by the sale of the administrator
of the estate of the owner. The defendant, as the owner's
widow, had possession. The court held that the statute requiring the commencement of legal proceedings as a condition
'Colo. Comp. Laws (1921), Sec. 4887. Damages for which the warrantor is
liable may be diminished by any profit which the warrantee has recovered from the
person bringing the eviction action. A restoration after eviction does not defeat the
right to bring the action but may go in mitigation of the damages.
It is an ancient maxim of law that no title is completely good unless the right of
possession be joined with the right to the property, which right is denominated a
double right and when to this double right the actual possession is also united then
there is, and then only, a complete legal title. 2 Blackstone 191. When none of the
parties have been in actual possession the covenant is broken at a time not later than
when the grantee is obliged to buy an outstanding title decreed to be in another. Hayden v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15, 88 Pac. 47 (1906).
Ernst v. St. Clair. 71 Colo. 353, 206 Pac. 799 (1922). held that notice to
the warrantor was a condition precedent to the bringing of the action by the warrantee. See also Hurd v. Smith, 5 Colo. 233 (1880).
'Seyfried v. Knoblauch, 44 Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993 (1908); 2 Colo. 620
(1875).
'2 Colo. 620 (1875).
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precedent, did not apply when the grantee has not obtained
possession nor when the holder of the adverse title has possession prior to and since the deed was executed. The paramount title must be shown to exist before or at the time the
defendant made his covenant and the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff to show the party by whom he was evicted had
the better title."
Before discussing the damage action as a recourse for the
breach, it is well to consider other rights of which the grantee
may avail himself. Colorado, like many of the other states,
has put upon its statute books an act for the registration of
land titles. By the operation of this law a grantee may register-his title by making application to the district court of the
county wherein the land is situated, the effect of which is to
quiet title in the grantee.7 The covenantee may then avail
himself of this safeguard. An action to quiet title after a
breach, while adequate, would, under some circumstances,
defeat the right to complete compensation to which the covenantee is entitled. This is so because the action is limited to
the determination of title and not to the recovery of damages.
When there has been a breach of the covenant the main inquiry is, of course, what is an adequate compensation to the
party injured? Hence, it is of greater importance to ascertain
the germane rules by which the amount of damages is to be
determined.
Perhaps the earliest case on the subject in this country
set forth what is known as the New York Rule, established
in the early case of Staats v. Ten Eyck.' The defendant's
testator had owned certain lots which came by mesne conveyances to C, the grantee of the plaintiff. C, being evicted, recovered against the plaintiff, who then sued the defendant on
'When the covenantee has extinguished the paramount title he will be limited to
the amount paid by him for that purpose including incidental expense and a reasonable compensation for his trouble, but in no event will it exceed in all the limit of
damages for a total breach. See also Stone v. Rozisk, 88 Colo. 399, 297 Pac. 999
(1931).
'Colo. Comp. Laws (1921), Sec. 4924-5025.
'3 Cainess 111 (N. Y.), 2 Am. Dec. 254.
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the covenants of seisin and quiet enjoyment.' The principal
question determined in the case was whether the measure of
damages was the value of the property at the time of the eviction, or at the time of the conveyance. The court applied the
common law rule that the recovery would be measured by the
value of the land at the time the warranty was made. The
general rule for the measure of damages when there is a total
breach of the covenant includes the value of the premises at
the time of the conveyance determined by the consideration
paid; interest to the time of the trial; mesne profits; and costs
and expenses incurred in defense of the title. 10
While most jurisdictions, including Colorado, have
adopted this general rule the covenant is regarded in some New
England states as intended to indemnify the covenantee for
any loss suffered by him, and as consequently to entitle him
to damages to the extent of the value of the land at the time
of the eviction." The adopted rule very definitely does not
allow recovery for an enhanced value of the land.
Upon this point there is opportunity for a change in the
law. Inasmuch as the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale applies
so that the compensation must equal the injury, there are circumstances under which the enhanced value may be a proper
inquiry. When the enhanced value is by reason of natural
development, there should be no quarrel with the present rule.
When the covenantee in good faith at his own expense makes
improvements which he cannot remove, it is contrary to the
fundamental concept of the law of damages to refuse recovery for the improvements. An analagous situation where a
'In Colorado the covenant runs with the land and inures to the benefit of all
subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. Com. Laws (1921), Sec. 4886. The
covenantee cannot release the covenant to an assignee and the assignee still has the
right of action against th original covenantor. The measure of damages for breach of
the covenant in a suit brought by a remote grantee is the consideration paid by the
warrantee to his immediate grantor with interest but not to exceed the amount of consideration given for the original conveyance by the original grantee. Although the
original grantee may sue all the previous covenantors simultaneously he is entitled to
but one satisfaction. A several judgment may be recovered but each is limited to the
consideration received by each grantor from the subsequent grantee. This rule gives
compensation for loss and that is all any evicted grantee can reasonably expect. Taylor
v. Wallace, 20 Colo. 211, 37 Pac. 963 (1894).
"Tibbets v. Terril, 44 Colo. 86, 96 Pac. 993 (1908) ; Jones v. Hayden, 3 C. A.
303 (1893) ; for collection of cases see 4 Sutherland, Damages (2nd Ed.), pp. 20972098; Staats v. Ten Eyck (N. Y.), 3 Cainess 111.
"Gore v. Braxier, 3 Mass. 523, 3 Am. Dec. 182.
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person claiming under a tax title makes improvements on the
land, Colorado has consistently held that recovery could be
had for improvements made in good faith. 2
Two of the more important specific elements of damage
are attorney's fees and interest. The general rule with reference to the former is that unless the contract provides therefor
or contemplates them they are not recoverable, but if the
plaintiff in good faith prosecutes or defends a previous action,
then attorney's fees will be granted.1" In allowing interest
the modern trend is for the courts to recognize that no good
reason exists for drawing an arbitrary distinction between
liquidated and unliquidated damages. Interest, therefore, is
a proper element of damages to be made in view of the demands of justice rather than through the application of an
arbitrary rule of law. Interest is generally computed to the
time of the trial upon the amount of the consideration paid."
The law involved in this discussion is of a peculiarly
technical nature; however, the authorities cited are offered to
the general practitioner as an indices to the governing authorities upon the general title.
"Knowles v. Martin, 20 Colo. 393, 38 Pac. 467 (1894): Central Realty Co.
v. Frost, 76 Colo. 413, 232 Pac. 111 (1924).
121 A. L. R. 332.
"Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.), Par. 299, 300, 312, 315.

DID YOU KNOW THATA Tennessee law makes it necessary for the driver of an automobile
to give ten days' notice that he is going to drive on any road-by tacking
notices alongside said road?
It is illegal to carry a cane in Texas?
The town of Glen Cove, N. Y., imposes a fine of $10 on any person
caught digging more than 24 sand worms at one time?
A statute in Kansas requires that every able-bodied citizen between
the ages of 21 and 60 shall kill grasshoppers one day each year?
A law of the town of Nottingham, Me., provides that hogs must be
allowed to roam loose between March 1 and October 20?
A North Carolina law makes it illegal to sing out of tune?

"NO MAN'S LAND"
EcclesiasticalProvincialPronunciamento
Of Jehovih's Sovereignty Over the Land of Shalam,
and Its Heavens
To His Excellency, The President of the United States of
America, et at.; and by you to all proper officers of your
Federal Government, concerned herewith, and to your
member State of Colorado; and to all citizens of your
great government; and generally, to all governments
among men,
GREETINGS:

Now comes the Universal Emancipation

Church, a corporate body, authorized under the laws of Colorado, U. S. A., with temporary offices at 1953 Lincoln Street,
Denver, Colorado, and by its due and lawful Supreme Regent,
does notify you officially of this claim and pronunciamento
of ecclesiastical provincial authority, control, possession and
power of domain, for Jehovih and His Organic Body in
Heaven and Earth, relating to lands situate in what is known
as the State of Colorado, in the United States of America, and
known to us to be The Land of Shalam, of certain sacred
writings, and by some men appropriately called "NO MAN'S
LAND," said lands being known and described to and by
your people as that tract of unconveyed land lying within the
borders of said State of Colorado, in the north central part
thereof, and which, prior to about 1876 A. D. was in the
possession and occupancy of the Ute Nation of North American Indians, by right and unquestionably; same being the
land proposed to be claimed by annexation to, and by, your
government, in ceremonies in which the Governor of Colorado is advertised to act-to be held August 8, 1936, near
Breckenridge, Colorado.
It is well known to officials of your governments, and
to many citizens thereof, that no valid earthly title or sovereignty therein and thereto, vests in any enforced government
among men; and that such privileges and occupation as your
government and your citizens enjoy or enforce, were obtained
by cunning, duress and force, and therefore wrongfully deprived them, the then rightful heirs-a group of organic worshipers of Jehovih, Nature's God, under the name of the
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Great Spirit, Who has preserved to this day, and shall forever
preserve said Land of Shalam from enforced governments and
religions.
Therefore, and as present day rightful successors and
spiritual heirs, as Jehovih's continuous worshipful organic
body with Him The Great Spirit of All Essence and Nature,
and as His present Organic Faithists in Him only, with Love
and Adoration for All Gods, Lord Gods, Lords and Angels
and mortals organic with Him, and as True Sons and Daughters of Jehovih, and as Heirs in His Holy Earthly Kingdom
and Sacred Land of Shalam, and heirs to be; in His Heavenly
Kingdoms, we do claim, herein and hereby, all of said lands
and territory and all title and sovereignty over same in the
trust and stewardship, and name of Universal Emancipation
Church, for Jehovih, The Great Spirit, for the purposes and
iases as are and shall be revealed to us by sacred writings and
inspiration of His Organic Angels; and preserved to Him, by
and through us as being inspired as His heirs and chosen Sons
in Affiliation with Him, so acting for Him in this matter of
preserving said Land of Shalam for its revealed sacred purposes.
Therefore, and because of the protecting influence of the
Natural Coincidence peculiar to the topography of said lands,
in relation to surrounding lands, together with the natural
right of occupancy and free possession this provision of Nature bestowed upon these Faithists, our Brothers in the Organic Earthly Body of Jehovih, we decree and declare as
inspired of Jehovih, that no valid title, jurisdiction or sovereignty of honor does or can vest in your government, or any
other enforced government among men, by the Laws of
Heaven or on Earth.
Therefore, neither Shalam, nor His chosen heirs within
its borders, shall ever be bound therein, by any sovereignty,
laws of edicts of any enforced government, meant by them to
apply within the borders of Shalam.
By the name Jehovih is meant: The Natural God;
the Omnipotent, Omniscient; Omnipresent All Possibility;
The Great Spirit; The Eternal Self Existing Uncreated Creator of All Manifestations of All Possibility; The All in All,
and All in the All; The Absolute Abstraction, Subjectivity
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and Objectivity; Supreme All Being; Who is The All Life,
Motion Individuality and Person, to Whom none can attain
forever, whose localized parts are organic with His Whole I
am Being:-by certain primitive men named after the sounds
of the wind, E-O-I-H, now pronounced Jehovih. Therefore,
in that name and for his revealed purposes it is declared that
said lands shall henceforth and forever be called Shalam, the
which shall ultimately be peacefully and gloriously restored to
His Chosen, in the sight of mortals and angels and thereafter
held intact for preparation and practice of Righteous Inspiration, and not to be bartered away or sold forever, in whole or
in part, nor by force ruled or defended by His Organic Body,
regardless of the attitudes or acts of the world's peoples. We
shall act persistently and non-resistantly in peace and authority as herein claimed and proclaimed and none shall stay the
hand of Jehovih; for our Faith is in Him and not in instruments of war, or the lower light of man, as inspired by False
Gods, inorganic or untrue to Jehovih's Light and purposes.
Faith in Our Father's All Highest Light of inspirations
of Love, Wisdom, Justice, Peace, o uad the Power of His Organic (True and Not False) High Raised Gods, Lord Gods,
Lords and Angels is sufficient unto His Own.
In this spirit we shall meet all men in making all adjustments in due time, and manner in the sight of men, to unquestionably restore Shalam to Jehovih before men and governments; all just claims of rights by those not organic hereto
adjusted amicably.
We court the co-operation and friendly aid of your great
government which is a type of organic Liberty, justice and
freedom, in the very heart of which he chose and peculiarly
preserved this site, secure from invasion by others, under your
inspired protectorate, and to be forever free from dictates of
man-made enforced governments.
Therefore take heed, Oh man! Jeopardize not yourselves before Jehovih, lest ye suffer the penalty of your own
chosen iniquity-for He is Creator and Destroyer. By virtue
of His Ever Living Presence all things are-By His Light
upon them are mortals or angels rewarded or punished.
Herein is Proclaimed a New Religion to mortals of this
Era, wherein mortals shall be lifted up and practice serving
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Jehovih by serving others Altruistically-instead of drawing
on others to serve self egoistically, the which is the basis of
the founding of Jehovih's Kingdom on Earth, and such of
necessity required, and Jehovih has possessed a land, Shalam,
free from all mortal force, and for the abolition of wars, poverty and injustice, and unto His Own.
AND NOW TO ALL ANGELS AND MORTALS:
To the North; To the East; To the South; To the West; To
the chosen of Jehovih, the All Highest Name; To all angels
and mortals organic with Him; By the power of Jehovih
upon me as Vice-Regent for Him, and as Supreme Regent of
Universal Emancipation Church, as His Organic Body on
earth for this purpose, and in his Holiest Name of All Names
-Jehovih--I hereby decree:
His Being, His Name, His Power, His Purpose and the
place of Shalam on the Red Star, the earth, has revealed and
declared to mortals, even unto the Four Dark Corners.
Place the invisible spiritual walls of protection around
the Holy Place of Shalam in North Quatama (North America), kep it inviolate for Jehovih's purpose and our inspiration from Him.
Inspire mortals; Rulers, Scientists, Technicians, Teachers, Physicians, Nurses, Captains of Industries, Stewards of
Wealth, yea the Rich and the Poor, and all men of influence,
to affiliate in the matter of their Light of Wisdom, and substance of the earth, to the All Highest Light, and the Kingdom
is come. All and sufficient is given unto mortals this day to
demonstrate an example of the Kingdom to All men, ending
War and Poverty, Preachment is now Practicement. Peace
and Plenty, be unto all who shall become organic with Him,
in His Service. Thou False, Sa'tan, give the Light of Jehovih
to thy hosts thou hast deceived and be Thyself lifted up, and
serve Him.
Know Ye: Universal Emancipation Church, by ViceRegency of Jehovih, and as a lawful body corporate, under
the laws of man, by the authority of its Supreme Regent and
as Vice-Regent of Jehovih, has decreed, declared and claimed
for Jehovih, and in the capacity of His Vice-Regent; All sovereignty of every nature, and all jurisdiction over, All rights
or titles in and to the herein described Land of Shalam, to-
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gether with all appurtenances thereto, and with all the natural
elements therein and thereunder, subject only to our rendition
of material justice to innocent claimants to alleged titles and
rights and property rights herein shown and declared to be
invalid. Also for a distance of five hundred miles above
Shalam and without intervening space as prepared by
Yaton'te, is reserved for Shalam's Heavenly Kingdom with all
elements and their uses as contained in Atmospheres, All
earthly Sovereignty and possession is herein decreed forever
inviolate and free from sovereignty, title or jurisdiction or
interference of any, and all enforced mortal Governments. In
Jehovih's name. AMEN.
UNIVERSAL EMANCIPATION CHURCH.
EDWIN S. AGNEW, as Supreme Regent.
Dated Denver, Colorado, July 29, 1936.
STATE OF COLORADO, COUNTY OF DENVER, ss.
I, Samuel R. Crawford, a Notary Public in and for The
City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, hereby certify that Edwin S. Agnew, who is personally known to me,
being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is the duly
qualified Supreme Regent of Universal Emancipation Church,
a corporation, and that in his said official capacity he has
signed and executed the above Pronunciamento, this 29th day
of July, in the City and County of Denver, Colorado, A. D.
1936.
My commission expires December 29, 1937.
SAMUEL R. CRAWFORD,

Notary Public.

(SEAL)
Filed in the office of the County Clerk and Recorder of
Grand County, Colorado, July 31, 1936.
File No. 46898.
NOTE: The foregoing was noted by Hayes R. Hindry, of the
Denver Bar, in an abstract brought to him for examination.
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
Of Herman Oberweiss, Offered for Probateat the June, 1934,
Term of County Court, Anderson County, Texas.
I am writing of my will mineself and des lawyir vant
he should have to much money he ask to many answers about
the famly. first think I vant I dont vant my brother oscar
get a god dam thing I got he is a mumser he done me out of
forty dollars fourteen years since.
I vant it that hilda my sister she gets the north sixtie
akers of at where i am homing it now i bet she dont get that
loafer husband of her to brake twentje akers next plowing the
gonoph work. she cant have it if she lets oscar live on it i
want i should have it back if she does.
tell moma that six hundret dollars she has been looking
for for ten years is berried from the bakhouse behind about
ten feet down she better let little frederick do the digging and
count it when he comes up.
pastor lucknitz can have three hundret dollars if he
kisses the book he vont preech no more dumhead talks about
politiks, he should a roof put on the meetinghouse with and
the elders should the bills look at.
moma should the rest get but i vant it so that adolph
should tell her what not she should do so no more slick irishers sell her vaken cleaners they noise like hell and a broom
dont cost so much.
i vant it that mine brother adolph be my evecter and i
vant it that the judge should please make adolph plenty bond
put up and watch him like hell adolph is a good business man
but only a dumkoph would trust him with a busted pfennig.
i vant dam sure that schliemial oscar dont nothing got
tell adolph he can have a hundred dollars if he prove judge
oscar dont get nothing that dam sure fix oscar.
(Signed)

HERMANN OBERWEISS.
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SHORTHAND REPORTING
A Little Understood Profession
Industrial Commission of Colorado
Three thousand men and women in the United States are engaged
in the practice of a profession--shorthand reporting-which is little
known or appreciated by the general public. Even lawyers and judges
with whom they come closely in contact do not realize the education
and training necessary for this work, the exacting duties performed, the
difficulties encountiered and the long hours and concentration required.
Shorthand is a method of brief writing by substituting symbols
or signs for letters, words or phrases. It has been in existence in some
form since the time of Julius Caesar. Pepys wrote his famous Diary by
means of abbreviated characters. Charles Dickens in "David Copperfield" tells of his struggles to master the art. In this country its advent
in the courts dates back to Civil War days. The invention and perfection of the typewriter made possible the general use of shorthand in
business.
There is a wide gap between the shorthand of the office stenographer and that of the shorthand reporter, and few, though possessed of
natural keenness of mind, quick perception and nimble, trained fingers,
have paid the price of the long hours of study and toil necessary to
bridge this gap.
As the other professions require years of preparation, so does
shorthand reporting. While the principles of shorthand may be acquired in a few months and commercial writing ability attained in a
year or less, many more months of incessant labor are necessary to
obtain the speed required for verbatim reporting. Then the reporter is
only at his commencement day. Years of experience and a fund of
knowledge must be his before he is a real reporter able successfully to
practice his profession and hold himself out for all kinds of reporting
jobs. Thus his basic preparation approaches that of the doctor or
lawyer, his hours of labor equal or exceed theirs, and his income compares in many cases favorably with theirs.
Colorado has a Certified Shorthand Reporters Law, under which
reporters must demonstrate their ability to accurately report and transcribe court and other proceedings before they are certified. The law
also requires courts to appoint only Certified Shorthand Reporters,
which is designed to raise the standard of efficiency in court work.
(Furnished Through Courtesy of Mr. John C. Peters, Reporter,
Colorado Industrial Commission.)
Under the provisions of the RFC Act there were 1,919 industrial
loans authorized after consideration of 4,699 applications received in
Washington and 6,952 received at the agencies.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUS OF JUROR-NOT WITHIN
COMPENSATION ACT.-Board of County Commissioners of the

County of Eagle, et at. v. Evans-No. 13,978-Decided August

10, 1936--Opinionby Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Evans was summoned to serve as a juror in the District Court in a
criminal case and after submission of case and the jury not having agreed
upon a verdict, they were kept in the jail over night and there being
insufficient covering, Evans caught cold which resulted in pneumonia
and by reason thereof was never able to work as before. The commission denied compensation, which ruling was reversed by the District
Court.
1. A juror is not a county employe within the meaning of the
compensation act.
2. The act only applies to "Every person in the service of the
state or of any county * * * under any appointment or contract
of hire, express or implied."
3. A juror does not come within such classification. His position as a juryman is not the result of contract. He functions as part of
the judicial machinery by majesty of the law and not by appointment
or contract.-Judgmentreversed.

APPEAL AND ERROR-MOTION TO DISMISS-STIPULATION OF FACTS
IN LIEU OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS--Luttrell vs. London and

Provincial Marine and General Insurance Company, LimitedNo. 13936-Decided July 27, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
The defendant in error moved to dismiss the writ of error for the
reason that the only error assigned is the insufficiency of the evidence
and because there was no bill of exceptions. The case was tried upon
written stipulation of facts filed with the clerk and appears in the
transcript.
1. The written stipulation of facts constituted a part of the
records and files of the clerk of the trial court and the transcript was
certified by him as containing true and correct copies of the records and
files.
2. Under rule 27a, which provides that copies of records and
files of the clerk of the trial court shall be certified by him and all other
portions of said transcript, save the assignments, shall be certified by
the trial judge. Under this rule it was not necessary to have a separate
bill of exceptions.-Motion to dismiss denied.

290

